Philosophy as Spiritual Discipline

by

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Philosophers and students of philosophy partial to Plato are fond of quoting A. N. Whitehead's suggestion that the safest characterization of the history of western philosophy is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato (1). Not so for Aristotelians, for whom the history of western philosophy might better be characterized as a series of corrections and improvements of the recurring versions of Platonism. Since Platonism and Aristotelianism repeatedly return to favor after each generation of critics and revisionists, it seems undeniable that each contains a portion of permanent truth not adequately expressed by the other.

Platonism and Aristotelianism in their many forms represent to each other the necessary philosophical polar opposite. Without the pole supplied by the other, the dynamic strength of each position would disappear. With some exaggeration, the polarity between Platonism and Aristotelianism can be expressed by a paraphrase of Kant: Platonism without Aristotelianism is empty, Aristotelianism without Platonism is blind. The exaggeration consists in the fact that Plato and Platonism provide volumes — indeed, universes — of content, and Aristotle and Aristotelianism have provided a profound vision of the processes of thought and nature. Nevertheless, the general tendency holds: Plato is akin to the imaginative (whether conceived as the dramatic or poetic, or, paraphrasing Emerson, artistry in the medium of theory), whereas Aristotle is akin to the factual, empirical and scientific, including the social scientific.

This polarity, which is at the base and throughout the history of western philosophy, provides the content and modus operandi of philosophy. It also accounts for the difficulty of philosophizing. Our choosing to take sides with Plato or Aristotle may be not much of a choice at all, but rather an expression of our innate temperament as developed and expressed through our social and intellectual biographies.

In "The Present Dilemma in Philosophy," the opening lecture of his classic text, Pragmatism, William James divides philosophies, and their exponents (whether accomplished scholars or rank beginners) as divisible into "two types of mental makeup":

The Tender-Minded
Rationalistic (going by "principles"); intellectualistic; idealistic; optimistic; religious; free-willist; monistic; dogmatical.

The Tough-Minded
Empiricist (going by "facts"); sensationalistic; materialistic; pessimistic; irreligious; fatalistic; pluralistic; skeptical (2).

It is not difficult to see that Platonists as a group share several of James' tender-minded characteristics whereas Aristotelians share several characteristics with the tough-minded. Whether we read the history of philosophy, and contemporary philosophic disputes, in terms of the Platonic/Aristotelian polarity, or in terms of James' tender- and tough-minded temperaments, the difficulties and challenges remain: how to understand those philosophies of so markedly a different feel from our own, particularly since the most determining factor, our personal differences, are thought to be an inadmissible consideration in philosophic discourse. James again, sees the situation correctly:

The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments. Undignified as such a treatment may seem to some of my colleagues, I shall have to take account of this clash and explain a good many of the divergencies of philosophy by it. Of whatever temperament a professional philosopher, he tries, when philosophizing, to sink the fact of his temperament. Temperament is no conventionally recognized reason, so he urges irrational reasons only for his conclusions. Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. It leads the evidence for him one way or the other, making for a more sentimental or a more hard-hearted view of the universe, just as this or that principle would. He trusts his temperament. Wanting a universe that suits it, he believes in any representation of the universe that does suit it. He feels men of opposite temper to be out of key with the world's character; and in his heart considers them incompetent and "not in it," in the philosophic business, even though they may far excel him in dialectic ability (3).

The situation which James refers to in 1907 as "The Present Dilemma in Philosophy" would seem to be at least as true of philosophizing today. Or, perhaps, considering that the analytic cast of mind which has dominated philosophizing in the English-speaking world for the past half century, in two respects the situation would seem to be worse now than in James' time: We may be even further from the
ideal and goal of a coherent and comprehensive philosophy, and, sided by the contemporary return to a sophistic relativism, even less inclined to consider seriously and sympathetically positions at variance with our own.

Both the classic Platonist/Aristotelian and the more modern rationalist/empiricist polarities strongly suggest that polarities are essential for the content and process of philosophy. They also provide cause to despair of the philosophic enterprise: the polar contrasts of worldview, of significance, evidence and argument, seem so unbridgeable as to daunt the courage of beginning student and professional alike.

Yet philosophy seems self-replenishing, and for good reason. The accepted limits to progress toward philosophical truth, as well as the value of philosophy (in light of these limits), are well summarized in Bertrand Russell’s Problems of Philosophy:

“Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions which engage our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good.”

Here, again, a polarity: on the one side, the inherent limits of philosophizing—that as a rule no answers can be known to be true—and on the other, despite this limitation, by attempting to reach the truth, the philosophical practitioner (whether student or professional) increases tolerance and capacity for contemplation of the Universe. It was in his capacity as a sometime Platonist that Russell wrote these lines—he who was after all, a mathematician, and therefore almost of necessity a Platonist. However, it was in his capacity as an empiricist that he helped Wittgenstein launch the analytic movement which effectively put an end to the influence of the idealists in particular, and metaphysics in general, in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition.

The effect of the analytic movement has been so decisive on philosophizing in the English speaking world because it struck at the conception of philosophy itself. Both logical positivism and linguistic analysis, in effect, refused dialogue with practitioners of traditional philosophical methods. The distinction between Platonic and Aristotelian was rendered inconsequential relative to the purpose and method of philosophy established in Austria and Britain immediately after the First World War (5). By this “revolution in philosophy,” it became axiomatic that one give little or no quarter to a competing position, but so far as possible attempt to show that competitors are not really doing philosophy at all. In his masterful survey of contemporary philosophies, Philosophy and the Modern World, Albert William Levi notes that philosophers not only do not agree on specific points of epistemology or metaphysics, but refuse to grant each other’s philosophical methods:

“When we view the philosophical fashions of the past five decades, we must be struck. I think, by the urgency with which the question of what philosophers ought to do and what philosophy is, has itself been put forward as one of the chief questions for philosophic debate. Nor is this simply the defensive strategy of strong-minded men who disagree. Aristotle disagreed with Plato and with love and regret and did not find it necessary to deny that Platonism was a philosophy. Locke disagreed with Descartes as to the origin of ideas, but he did not maintain that the use of a rational method inspired by the successes of mathematics disqualified a man from the practice of philosophy. Kant proclaimed his “Copernican Revolution” with deep sincerity and assurance, but this did not prevent him from paying his intellectual debt to the “celebrated Leibniz” and “the estimable Mr. Locke,” with both of whom he significantly differed. But the philosophic movements of the recent past are to be viewed as waves of successive reform beating upon an infinite shore, with each group of partisans committed to a conception of philosophy which assures them a virtual monopoly of its legitimate practice (6).

Withholding methodological legitimacy from one’s philosophic competitors as a way of assuring one’s philosophical supremacy reveals the extent to which philosophers, perhaps to an even greater extent than practitioners of other disciplines, are prone to ideology and self-interested disputation. Admittedly, this is not the ideal time to expect that a search for truth might prove successful, but it might be the ideal time to return to the Socratic-Platonic conviction that the search is its own reward. We would then have to take seriously the fact that in the Platonic Academy, as in the The Republic (Book VI), aspirants to philosophy had to undergo a rigorous moral as well as mathematical training. One could only see the Forms—

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Love, Truth and Beauty, and ultimately, The Good—by the transformation of one’s capacity for intuition. A capacity for mystical-philosophical insight which combined intellectual knowing and spiritual vision could only be attained with the help of a teacher and the discipline of disciplined practice. Hence, Russell’s suggestion that through philosophy the mind “becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good.”

For us ordinary practitioners, however, what would be the practical and contemporary equivalent of philosophic contemplation? The term might at first sound forbidding, but with use, it could prove congenial: to contemplate means to observe deliberately and meditatively, to reflect upon openly and receptively. The term contemplation sounds unphilosophical—mystical, otherworldly, as well as, perhaps, vague, and passive—because it is usually associated with attention to some version of the Divine, of the Absolute, of Stillness.

As ordinarily understood, meditation and contemplation would refer to the disciplined attempt to unite with ideas other than one’s own. Meditation and contemplation are essential for this task because of the difficulty involved in getting outside of one’s temperamental predispositions and intellectual assumptions. By the criterion of philosophy as a spiritual discipline, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, James, Royce and Whitehead, Buber, Steiner and Barfield, number among those philosophers who are prized because, in quite different ways, they show a willingness and ability to enter into the thoughts of others and to think beyond the limits of self-interested, merely dispositional preferences. They show the positive results of a disciplined attempt at a wider, widening search in realms of thought and experience at polar odds with the views which it would have
been easier, but less truthful, for them to have accepted.

Such a practice might not only reward the practitioner with a glimpse of truth — as the meditator is rewarded with a glimpse of the divine — but in the process the practitioner might expect some measure of transformation of character and capacities. Yet no such discipline or practice is prescribed for those who study or profess philosophy in our time.

What are the possibilities for contemporary Platonists and Aristotelians, rationalists and empiricists, tender- and tough-minded philosophers to meet each other's claims and contentions? Did Socrates and Plato hear the views of the Sophists? Did Aristotle sympathetically hold in view his teacher's theories? In our century, did James seriously consider the Absolute idealism of his colleague and friend, Josiah Royce, whose American version of Hegelian Platonism can be described by many of the characteristics of the tender-minded philosopher, as James' own philosophy falls on the tough-minded side?

These historical, and highly influential, thinkers offer excellent exhibits for our attempt to discern the spiritual qualities latent in the philosophic enterprise. Of all the philosophers who have attempted to combine the rational and empirical, tough- and tender-minded qualities, none offers such a rich array of polarities as does Plato, who holds the philosophical as well as generational middle position between his teacher, Socrates, and his student, Aristotle.

To begin with Socrates, who is at least symbolically, if not historically, the beginning of Western philosophy, we find an intriguing and seldom acknowledged polarity at the core of his mission. To a significant extent, the history of philosophy is at odds with Socrates, thought to be the archetypal philosopher, in that he begins and ends his career in a decisively non-philosophical fashion: He enters upon the philosophic quest on the directive of an oracle, and he concludes his life with a ringing affirmation of the afterlife even though he lacks philosophical knowledge of what will follow his imminent death (7).

In both situations, Socrates serves as a model of engagement and existential seriousness, but not particularly of philosophic purity. On either side of Socrates-the-philosopher is Socrates who obeys oracles and Socrates who believes in the afterlife. The complete Socrates must be seen in the existential, lived situation — launching a career and facing death — as well as in his role as questioner and searcher for truth.

Following Socrates, Plato built a dialectic into his philosophy from the outset, not only in the way he arrived at his position, but in his subsequent critiques, e.g., in his Parmenides, of even those ideas which he and his followers regarded as central to his position. Plato's dialogues are so full of dramatic tensions and taut polarities that each generation of students and professors of philosophy finds new problems, resolutions and suggestions for novel thinking.

From the vantage point of more than two millennia, and countless philosophical systems, Asian as well as western, it is obvious that Aristotle was more Platonic than histories of philosophy would suggest: criticisms of Plato's Theory of Forms in Aristotle's Metaphysics were developed as an attempt to improve the essential components of Plato's thought (8). Furthermore, Aristotle shared with Plato classical Greek presuppositions concerning human nature, time and space, the polis and the nature of reason. In a way that seems paradoxical, but is in fact intelligible and predictable, these shared philosophical assumptions sharpened Aristotle's differences with his teacher. Differences within the context of a shared worldview press more forcefully, and yield more prescient results on philosophical inquirers, than do differences which are nearly total. Dialogue requires polarity — ends held in tension. Philosophical positions can only creatively meet when they share a sufficiently meaningful piece of reality to provide a common ground, a shared terminology and set of tasks.

Although Aristotle's Metaphysics might seem to us, as it certainly does to our students, as an instance of Olympian calm, far removed from the existential drama of Socrates locked in dialogical struggle with his sophist opponents, the same urgency attends Aristotle's attempt to solve the problem of form and matter. Can there be a more pressing task for contemporary thought than an adequate formulation of matter and spirit? On first hearing (or reading), Aristotelian ideas might seem removed, but a group of philosophers in dialogue, as well as a philosopher in a classroom living through the dialectic with and for his or her students, can show as vividly as a Platonic dialogue the urgency of questions such as the one and the many, or form and matter.

Although the Platonic/Aristotelian polarity might seem to contemporary students slightly less urgent than modern polarities such as theist/atheist, Marxist/Existentialist, materialist/idealist, creationist/evolutionist, neither in its original version, nor at any time since, has the dialectic between Plato and Aristotle, or Platonism and Aristotelianism, lost its existential bite. In this respect, it well serves as an example of philosophizing in general. Revising Whitehead slightly, we might suggest that the safest characterization of western philosophy is that it consists in the adding of footnotes to the dialogue between Platonism and Aristotelianism. And in the Asian philosophical tradition, although competing philosophical schools are not based on Platonism and Aristotelianism, something of the same dialectic of polar tensions has been at work in the Advaitist and Mimamsa traditions of India and the Confucian and Taoist-Buddhist traditions of China (9).

Although the history of philosophy seems to be best interpreted as a complex dialogue between competing positions such as the Platonic and Aristotelian, it does not provide many classic texts in dialogue form. We could suggest that all subsequent philosophers were discouraged from attempting dialogue form because Plato set the level too high, but this argument fails because Plato's and Aristotle's incomparably high level of philosophizing did not discourage their successors, any more than tragedians were discouraged by Sophocles or Shakespeare. The reason for the paucity of dialogues in the history of philosophy may be due to the extreme difficulty for most philosophers, and particularly philosophers passionately committed to establishing a specific position, of presenting competing ideas with vitality and credibility. Commitment to a truth may be the natural (though not fatal) enemy of philosophic dialogue.

David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (posthumously published in 1779), one of the obviously successful dialogues in the history of philosophic writing, would seem to have been aided by the author's skepticism and literary imagination. Although Hume could be dogmatic and argumentative, his Dialogues shows the best fruit of his two loves — the play of study and society. The Dialogues
present the memorable dispute between Demea, Hume’s version of a tender-minded Platonist who wants to prove the existence of God by an a priori argument based on an intuitive idea of the divine, and Philo, a tough-minded Humanist empiricist and skeptic. Between these two is Cleanthes, an Aristotelian who combines empirical observation and rational principles, and thereby attempts to prove the existence of God by observation of the natural world and an argument by analogy. The entire dialogue is a masterpiece of listening and responding, as well as evading, miscontruing, and from beginning to end leaves room for the reader to continue in doubt as to the conclusion and as to Hume’s own position.

Readers of these pages will probably be familiar with Owen Barfield’s Worlds Apart (10), too recent to be a classic, but quite successful for bringing into focus the conflict of competing philosophical paradigms. Without suggesting a too simple, or directly casual, relationship between particular personalities and their respective ideas, Barfield allows us to experience a convincingly subtle (and in a few cases not so subtle) connection between these characters and their philosophical positions. Platonic and Aristotelian themes abound, as do a variety of philosophical and scientific theories such as Darwinism, Freudianism, and linguistic analysis, but the value, and indeed, truth of the book lies in the exchanges, the existential sticking points and failed opportunities.

As The Republic, Plato’s most confident and systematic dialogue, ends with a myth, Barfield’s Worlds Apart ends with a dream. With respect to the possibilities and limitations of philosophic progress by dialogue, it would seem to be significant that it is not until after the weekend symposium that through his dream, the Christian apologist-theologian, finally gets a glimpse of the position which Barfield (in the characters of Burgeon and Sanderson) has been espousing. After the last line, the reader continues in dialogue. Unlike most of his characters (who are entirely believable in their resistance to positions other than their own), Barfield shows in this dialogue that he understands, with sympathy and insight, the philosophical positions with which he disagrees. In this habit of grasping from the inside a range of theories competing with his own, Barfield is following the example of Rudolf Steiner, whose Riddles of Philosophy (11) evidences his remarkable ability to think with, and through, a host of philosophies in competition with his own.

As a result of arguing for forty years with his friend C. S. Lewis (whose theological position resembles Hunter’s in Worlds Apart), Barfield knew painfully well the tenacity with which even the most enlightened truth-seekers avoid confronting positions unfriendly to their own, Barfield remained frustrated with Lewis’ refusal to read or seriously consider the spiritual-scientific research of Barfield’s teacher, Rudolf Steiner. Markers in “the great war” (12) between Barfield and Lewis include Lewis’ pointed remark that “Barfield changed me a good deal more than I him” (13); Barfield’s dedication of his Poetic Diction (1972) “To C. S. Lewis: ‘Opposition is true friendship’” (14); and Lewis’ dedication of his Allegory of Love — to “Owen Barfield: Wisest and best of my unofficial teachers” (15). These dedications issue from decades of friendship, shared commitment to truth, and incessant dialogue concerning most — though not all — of their respective opinions. They stand out in our time as exemplary practitioners of the intellectual life as spiritual discipline.

Another example of this rare ability is to be found in Sri Aurobindo’s one-thousand page metaphysical treatise, The Life Divine (16). Aurobindo so successfully grasps positions other than his own that his readers tend to be unprepared for the telling critique which follows each of the lengthy, sympathetic presentations of these positions. Since Steiner and Aurobindo share this ability with Plato, we should perhaps conclude that as a preparation for philosophical dialogue, training in mysticism and clairvoyance might be as important as training in disputation.

But what hope is there for philosophical dialogue for those of us who lack mysticism, clairvoyance and superabundance of philosophical plasticity? Do ordinary philosophical practitioners also evidence this ability to penetrate alternative positions? Perhaps the most innate sympathetic philosopher of the modern period is William James. It is James who gives us the characteristically American pluralistic definition of philosophy as “the habit of always seeing an alternative” (17). Although he did not write a dialogue, he certainly did develop his philosophical ideas in polar tension with Hegelian idealism as represented by Josiah Royce, his colleague and friend at Harvard (18). The passionately conducted argument over idealism and the Absolute between James and Royce, who were neighbors in Cambridge for twenty-five years, is comparable to the Lewis-Barfield ‘great war’ in philosophical productivity as well as in longevity and intensity. While preparing the Gifford Lectures of 1900-02 (an honor for which he had previously recommended Royce), James showed that neither friendship nor a celebrated fascination with the varieties of opinion were sufficient bulwark against the stronger pleasure of establishing one’s ideas against the opposition. James wrote to Royce:

When I write, ‘tis with one eye on the page, and one on you. When I compose my Gifford Lectures mentally, ‘tis with the design exclusively of overthrowing your system, and ruining your peace... (19).

All of James’ writings on religion, metaphysics and philosophic method evidence the tension which he felt in relation to Royce’s Absolute idealism. When it wasn’t Royce on whom he focused, it was on other idealists — Hegel himself, or F. H. Bradley (20). As Gregory Bateson says of ideas developed in conversation — that they belong as much to the listener as to the speaker (21) — Royce and the idealists he represented in James’ mind may rightly be said to deserve half credit for James’ clear and forceful expression of pluralism and radical empiricism.

James and Royce might not pass as a model of philosophical debate quite at the level of Plato and Aristotle, but they surely represent the positive features of learning and clarifying in polar relation to a competing position. What H. T. Costello remarked concerning Royce applies equally to James, the archetypal pluralist and comproviser: “Plato said you cannot really learn philosophy from books; they do not explain or answer back. They need the personal touch, and that is what Royce gave us” (22).

To know an ideal, we need negative as well as positive examples. Unfortunately, the most discussed philosophy book in several decades, Allan Bloom’s The Closing of the American Mind (23), is a stunning example of non-dialogical thinking. Bloom’s book is overrun with passionately held opinions concerning
segments of the culture — professors and
students, popular music, minorities,
women — from which its author seems to
be estranged, or at least to be judging from
a distance. He does not read or evaluate
his major philosophers from a distance, but
he fails dramatically as a teacher: he reads
Plato, Nietzsche and Heidegger with a
highly subjective filter and fails to render
them any more intelligible or relevant than
they are in their own words.

In attempting to expose — and the book
is entirely an exposé; it offers no solutions
— the failures of contemporary American
thinking and values, particularly as espoused and exemplified by the
university, this book reveals a hostility toward
the American culture he is attempting to
analyze and reform. Consider a book
concerned with the closing of the American
mind, and subtitled “How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy
and Impoverished the Souls of Today’s
Students,” with no discernible influence of
a single American philosopher. Bloom
totally ignores Emerson and James, and
refers to Dewey three times, incausally
and unsympathetically. Yet Bloom’s
thesis — that philosophical ideas and ideals
have lost their power because American
professors have brought into the success of
the sciences and social sciences — found
its expression in James’ writings a century
ago. And although Dewey’s robust
commitment to a naturalistic humanism
was a symptom of an unsympathetic interpreter of
classical philosophical thought, in theory
and practice he offered more for the
construction of a humane society than can
be found in this book by a philosopher
closed to the positive characteristics of
the American mind (24).

But there is another problem in Bloom’s
book: like Huston Smith and the
Traditionalist-Perennialist position, Bloom
criticizes relativism, scientism and
humanism — i.e., the context, or contextu-
sity, which stands in polar relation to
the Source, the Eternal and Ineffable. But
unlike Smith, and the Traditionalists
generally (e.g., Henri Corbin and Fritzof
Schoon), he seems unaware of the need for
a discipline which would yield such an
experience. Whereas Smith makes me
struggle — and want to know why I fail
to experience this timeless reality so
forcefully that the historical context pales
by comparison — I react to Bloom’s book
with dismay. What is the point of his attack
against relativism when he offers no
evidence of absolute values, nor access to
philosophers who have overcome relativ-
ism, nor a method or discipline by which
his readers could begin the journey from
the relative to the absolute. Rather, he uses
his arsenal of European philosophy to turn
a general failure of our time into a com-
plaint against a culture which he reads
from a privileged, uninformed perspective.
His account of both the American mind
and “the souls of today’s students” is so
selective, distorted and self-indulgent that
the entire book ironically makes a strong
case for the value of social sciences as a
way of overcoming prejudicial and
stereotypical judgements.

But my concern in this article on
philosophy as spiritual discipline is not
primarily to criticize Bloom’s book — others
have done so brilliantly and at length (25)
— but the degree to which, and the ways in
which, this book is a negative example of
the ideal I am espousing. Whereas my dis-
agreement with Huston Smith leads me to
read his works, and the works of those who
have influenced him, with a healthy
anxiety about my own position, Bloom
leads me to argue on the level of subjective
preference, life-styles (26) and popular
culture. The book is so subjective that it
focuses our attention on the author instead of
on his philosophers, his arguments, or
his presumed search for truth.

When a philosopher writes autobiography philosophically, with an eye for
truth which combines, or reconciles, the individual and the universally human, i.e.,
when the philosopher is also an artist, the reader is engaged, and perhaps elevated
both imaginatively and philosophically. Bloom fails to do this because he fails at
dialogue: as I read this book I find its author learned and passionate, but unwise
and intolerant. Bloom presents himself as
a Socratic and a Platonist, but in the The
Closing of the American Mind he is no
knower of the forms.

Bloom’s book is an opportunity missed: a half million copies of a philosophy book
sold in this time of philosophic in-
difference, and what does it offer but
condescension and complaint — no
guidance, no dialogue. We do get from
Bloom that philosophy is terribly
important, or ought to be, but little or no
sense of how to go about it, or how to use
the great thinkers to solve our most press-
ing problems. In the end Bloom recom-
mends the “good old great books ap-
proach” (27) but gives few if any clues as
to how, or why, the great books would
solve our problems (except indirectly —
by serving as instruments for intellectual
sharpening). But as a result of his neglect
of the historical context (or, more
accurately, the context of the evolution
of consciousness — a concept even further
from Bloom’s perspective), the great books
of the past are recommended but with no
indications as to how these books could be
rendered contemporary.

If not to Bloom, then to whom should we turn for guidance in these
philosophically impoverished times? Thinkers worthy of our time and effort
would have to have earned their insights
by patient, dialogical thinking, and be able
to give hints as to how they are proceeding.
In this respect, Plato and Aristotle remain
our peerless teachers, but for Platonists
and Aristotelians working with more contem-
porary materials, we should focus on those
thinkers who have entered into the minds
of their major alternatives. Martin Buber,
for whom all living is dialogue, struggled
throughout his life to reconcile, without
losing either pole, such polarities as
philosophy and religion, contemporary
anxiety and Biblical faith, existential
individuality and the self as defined by
community (28).

In the American tradition, James looked
deeper into both science and religious
experience and sought to develop a position
to the best of both (29). Alfred North
Whitehead, whose major works were writ-
ten in conscious continuity with the insights
of William James, can be read as an exam-
ple of his educational ideal (30) — a
combination of general ideas and concrete
fact. On his Platonic side he held to eternal
ideas, whereas his Aristotelian sensibility
found expression in his Concept of Nature.
and in his account of "Nature and Life" in *Modes of Thought* (31). More recently, Gregory Bateson has written wisely concerning the obstacles to interpersonal dialogue and clear thinking, and the social context within, or by, which ideas are generated and shared (32).

To my mind, no thinker has so extensively and profoundly explored and extended the Platonic and Aristotelian perspectives without sacrificing either as has Rudolf Steiner in his multi-volume attempt to show the intricately, awesomely detailed, interpenetration of the spiritual and natural (33). For twenty-five years he conducted original and highly informative spiritual-scientific research (34). Readers of this journal know the works in which Owen Barfield and Georg Kühlewind have articulated the conditions, processes and fruits of conscious, willful spiritual thinking. In order to know of such things, Buber and James spent decades in diligent personal-dialogical research. I believe that Huston Smith and his colleagues are engaged in a similar research (36).

These thinkers exemplify the ideal of philosophizing as a path to self-development, and thereby invite us to join in a similar effort. The problem, however, is simply that in daily life — and it was true of their daily lives as well — we fail at philosophy because it is too risky, and irksome, to subject our favorite ideas to criticism and rebuff. Even relatively pacific dialogue requires more philosophic effort, and risk, than most professors of philosophy ordinarily care to invest. Despite the presumably universal commitment to the ideal of dialogue among philosophers, as a profession, philosophy shares many of the attitudes of business, politics and athletics. The mode of discourse at large conferences such as the American Philosophical Association, which several thousand philosophers attend annually in the largest hotels in major cities, reveals the extent to which philosophy is a pugilistic profession. In this environment, philosophers seem to value "knock-down" arguments and clever moves more than truth-searching or personal development. Even the most scholarly, technical philosophical discussions take on the mind-set typically associated with corporation boards and political meetings. Regular participants at most professional meetings (37) have learned that there is little chance of genuine, sustained dialogue at conferences, symposia and colloquia populated by professors of philosophy.

Because it is so rare, and arrived at by such strenuous effort, genuine philosophic dialogue, when it does take place, deserves to be acknowledged. Congratulations then to the rash, but ultimately vindicated, organizers of an Esalen-sponsored one-week conference held for three consecutive years, with eighteen philosophers assigned the daunting task of "revisioning philosophy." The group was no doubt counting on the famed sulphur tubs and natural beauty of Esalen, on the Pacific Ocean at Big Sur, California, to soften the characteristically hard edges of philosophical argument. The Esalen atmosphere with two full decades of realizing its slogan, "Loose your mind. Come to your senses." no doubt made a contribution to the civility which characterized more than forty hours in formal session and at least ten or twenty informal hours of philosophical discussion. More likely, however, the credit should go to the distinctive composition of the group: approximately half of the eighteen participants were committed to some form of spiritual teaching and/or practice, and brought to this symposium an interest in the relationship between philosophy and a spiritually-based epistemology.

Other dominant themes and approaches to philosophy — feminist, ecological, social and economic — clearly indicate that this was a non-standard group of philosophers. Non-standard concerns — those regarded as "soft" or "fringy" by philosophers at the center (which is still dominated by an analytic methodology and set of topics) — might help to account for the less contentious atmosphere at these symposia, but it seems more likely that most of the participants recognized that the activity of philosophy requires a special discipline, and that this activity when properly practiced is not only rewarding of philosophical fruits, but is its own reward. This recognition was not much discussed but it was noticeably practiced, as became obvious during the occasional lapses when the tone and style came more to resemble standard philosophical discussion.

In each of the Esalen-sponsored conferences which I attended within the last year (two in California, one in New Hampshire), Huston Smith, author of the classic text, *The Religions of Man*, and more recently of *Forgotten Truth and The Post-Modern Mind*, was at the center of the philosophic debate (38). Professor Smith, who is unfailingly polite and articulate, is diligently at work on fundamental questions of great import for contemporary values. He has written cogently and with conviction against the shrinking of the modern western model of knowledge, and is attempting to establish a perennialist ontology — i.e., an account of the real, or the universe, which is not reducible to the relativism of perspectives, whether of history or language.

Huston Smith is an interesting exhibit for the question of philosophy as dialogue and spiritual discipline because his lifework is influenced and perhaps inspired, by the teaching of the great religions. Yet I am not alone in criticizing Huston for missing — not taking seriously enough — the perspective, ideas and arguments brought against his position. One can almost hear and feel the unvocalized response of Huston's disputation: "How can someone so inquisitive and careful not see the force of this evidence brought against this perennial philosophy?"

In the introduction to an article in *Religion and Intellectual Life*, Huston refers to this philosophical stand-off:

> What follows is a draft of a short section in the book I am working on in which I try to fend off assailants (representatives of Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Derrida) so that I can continue on my way. Friends whom I respect tell me that my adversaries will not recognize themselves in my depictions of them. I am prepared to believe that this is so, but I have not been able to hear clearly from these friends where my readings err. (39)

In the face of missed philosophical dialogue I am invariably reminded of the dissertation written by my friend Patrick Hill, the thesis of which is that each contributor to the history of western philosophy has proceeded by acknowledgments...
edging the importance of his predecessor’s thought, but not taking seriously enough its distinctive idea (40). Huston Smith and the Perennialists as a group seem to me a case in point: they take the relativity of context seriously, but from the point of view of a pragmatic, processive existentialist or evolutionist perspective they do not take the relative seriously enough.

One can hear the identical debate between the exponent of the Advaita Vedanta of Shankara (i.e., the non-dual or monistic system of the ninth century Hindu saint-philosopher) and the defender of the temporal, spatial and individual. For the Advaitins, Shankara’s commitment to the absolute unity of reality, or Brahman, results in a doctrine of maya, all that is not Brahman per se — all that appears to us, in our ignorance (avidya) as plural and real but in truth is not plural at all, but is Brahman. For the Advaitin, Brahman is The Absolute, one without a second which, in its perfect unity, includes the plurality of space, time, persons, and gods (41). In polar distinction with the advaitism of Shankara is the “qualified Advaita” of Ramanuja, the eleventh-century philosopher-saint. For the unqualified Advaitins, Ramanuja’s “qualified” Advaitism gives too great a reality to the particular; it “does not take seriously enough” the absolute unqualified oneness of Brahman and the resulting relative unreality of maya.

In a similar way, in the course of the recent Esalen conference, “Revisioning Philosophy,” I heard myself complaining to Huston Smith that he “did not take seriously enough” the evolution of consciousness. Convinced, as I am, of the qualitative differences between the thinking — or rather perceiving and imaging, and not-yet thinking — of the Egyptians, Hebrews and early Greeks, I felt that Huston was admitting to evolution (read as change of species and cultural forms), but “not taking seriously enough” the struggle of humanity to achieve a new and advanced level of consciousness. Following the lead of Sri Aurobindo and Rudolf Steiner (as well as with Hegel and process thinkers such as Bergson and Whitehead), I argued against Huston Smith’s claims for an unmediated experience of Truth and Reality, and in favor of an evolutionary process by which each experience of Truth and Reality is a function of a dialogue between the temporal and eternal.

For those who reject the spiritual altogether — which includes the vast majority of philosophers and professors of philosophy (and, it seems, an increasing number of theologians and professors of comparative religion) — my disagreement with Huston Smith must seem like an argument between Baptists and Methodists as observed by a Marxist or secular humanist. Typically, the arguments closest to home are the fiercest. When I engage in philosophical dialogue with exponents such as Huston Smith or James Cutsinger (professor of religion, University of South Carolina, author of a recent study on Coleridge (42), and an enthusiastic reader of Owen Barfield), I think that they should accept my complete package, evolution and all. Playing James to their Royce, Barfield to their Lewis, I find it perplexing that they stubbornly persist in taking more seriously than I the experience of the eternal, ineffable divine reality. So within the framework provided by the affirmation of spiritual reality, they continue to espouse and represent Perennialism or Traditionalism whereas I espouse and represent spiritually-based evolutionism.

With the Perennialist, I agree that more did not come from less, but rather less (matter, time and space) came from more (the divine source of all). This position meets head-on the concept of naturalistic evolutionism according to which mind evolved from matter. But, against Perennialism, and with Aurobindo and Steiner (as well as with Hegel and process thinkers such as Bergson and Whitehead), I am arguing that the material evolved from the spiritual (or Logos, Geist, Mind or Spirit, or an ontological prior by another name). The difference in these two positions, then, does not involve the reality or value of the spiritual source of evolution, but rather the degree of reality, or degree of value, attached to the change of consciousness from earliest times to the present — and into the future. Whereas I argue that the struggle of the evolution of consciousness toward love and freedom represents not only a change, but an intelligible, appropriate progression, the Traditionalist position remains convinced that this change from one mode of consciousness to another does not essentially alter the value of the mediated reality relative to the ineffable eternal.

As this dialogue with Huston Smith and the Perennialist position progresses, we can also hope that it will provide an opportunity to realize the ideal and the fruits of philosophizing as a spiritual discipline.

The beauty of the Esalen-sponsored symposium is that the same participants sat in the same room for six days, returning again and again to the most basic and challenging philosophical issues. Symposia which are more focused can be even more productive, particularly, when, as in the following symposium, all of the participants were well prepared by position papers distributed in advance, and most, if not all, of the participants were committed to the positive relationship between a meditative practice and intellectual inquiry.

In March. 1988. The Elmwood Institute (44) sponsored a symposium on “Cognition and Creation,” featuring particularly the views of Fritjof Capra, author of The Tao of Physics (44), Turning Point (45), and Uncommon Wisdom (47), and Georg Kühlewind, author of Stages of Consciousness (48) and Becoming AWARE of the Logos (48). Although there were a dozen others of us at this symposium, the writings and contributions of these thinkers provided the polar tension of the essential topics, metaphors and terms of reference.

From the perspective of philosophy as a spiritual discipline, one of the intriguing developments in this symposium was the use of models, paradigms and broad scientific-philosophical contexts which formed the key concepts and points of reference for the symposium. The entire group presupposed the negative influence of Cartesian dualism, but Capra and Kühlewind brought this up with or embodied, a distinctive background which somehow took up residence in the group. In addition to the working papers by Fritjof Capra, Georg Kühlewind, Tyrone Cashman, Charlotte Linde, Friedemann-Eckart Schwarzkopf and Francisco J. Varela, most of the participants were familiar with the philosophical and scientific context from which, or out of which, Capra and Kühlewind were working. Although he has been profoundly influenced by Steiner (and to a lesser extent by Zen and Heidegger, linguistics and a host of other studies), Kühlewind neither referred to Steiner nor in any way used him as an authority figure. Capra was no less his own person, speaking, it seemed, entirely from his own personal experience and intellectual research. For the purposes of the symposium, however, he built up his post-Cartesian view with the aid of Gregory Bateson and the Chilean biologists, Humbert Maturana and Francisco Varela,
co-authors of the Santiago theory of cognition according to which cognition is a continual bringing forth of a world (as knowledge) by the process of living.

As in all philosophic discussion, we as participants were called upon to hear and respond to the opinions and arguments of others, and simultaneously (in varying degrees, depending on the extent of our familiarity with these sources) to come to terms with the philosophical and scientific contexts within which these two thinkers, and other participants, were working. Since all philosophers, even those such as Capra and Kühlewind who are noticeably free of discursive and derivative thinking, offer ideas which inevitably carry presuppositions, historical associations and weighted terminology, philosophic dialogue as spiritual discipline in this context required that we come to terms with the positive and negative influences of previous paradigms.

Many of the same positive qualities which characterized the Esalen symposia were in evidence at this Elmwood Institute conference. These four symposia have given me hope concerning the possibility of practicing philosophy as a spiritual discipline within a diverse group of opinionated philosophers. It also adds support to my conviction that philosophizing could become a spiritual exercise peculiarly appropriate and needed in our time. When approached as a spiritual discipline, philosophy will be seen to resemble the ideal expression of varied sciences and arts — for when philosophy, sciences and arts are in ideal form, they issue harmoniously from sympathetic imagination. In perfect expression, both interpersonal and international affairs can be regarded equally as science or art. (Hence the affinity of Dag Hammarskjöld, diplomat of peace, and Martin Buber's "I-thou": philosophy of interpersonal relations) (49).

Philosophy, along with other distinctly human activities, requires and advances by sympathetic exploration and speculation, by listening and dialogue. Unlike most other disciplines which are dependent upon personal qualities, however, there is little or no attention in professional philosophy to the cultivation of personal — i.e., other or more than intellectual — capacities which would enable the philosophical practitioner to know more truly and profoundly.

What is the possibility for such a discipline, practically as well as theoretically considered? Building on James' call for a candid confession of temperamental differences and an equally forthright embrace of the pluralism which must follow such differences, it would seem that we need to develop the ideal and habit of philosophizing within the strengths and limits of our personal histories and orientations. The differences of philosophic outlook, like the differences of temperament and personal preference in other areas of life, can be considered, and acted upon, as opportunities for personal and philosophical growth. At a time in our cultural life when virtually every activity and skill has been packaged as an inner activity and path, philosophy remains a curious exception. It would seem to be time to follow James in restoring consideration of personality to philosophic dialogue — and time to emulate the mystics and great spiritual teachers in transforming personality by spiritual discipline.

In the tradition of Plato, or more accurately Plotinus and Neo-Platonism, the work of J. N. Findlay stands out as perhaps the most original and significant (50). The extent of his commitment to the practice as well as the theory of meditative philosophizing is evident in all of his writings, but most particularly in his Gifford Lectures of 1965-66, revealingly entitled The Discipline of the Cave and The Transcendence of the Cave. Findlay's use of the cave metaphor is truer than Plato's brief, and rather misleading, allegory of the cave (51) in that Findlay is at pains to show the struggle to integrate the mystical into a systematic ontology and epistemology. Plato of course, was no less detailed and patient in his attempt at rendering mathematical and spiritual insights in dialectic form, but for purposes of philosophy, the allegory itself has left as a permanent deposit in the western mind — on all of the 'footnotes' constituting the history of western philosophy — too sharp a dualism between ordinary thinking and thinking outside the cave, in the Sun which is the Good. Findlay is one of the most careful and convincing exponents of a philosophic method by which to ascend to the divine, to the One (52).

As Findlay is on the Platonic side, Rudolf Steiner is on the Aristotelian side of the attempt to provide a complete account of reality by active — Steiner would call it free or spiritual — thinking. Although he started his life work as an idealist (his doctoral dissertation was on Fichte) (53), his work on Goethe's natural science (54) in combination with his own natural-scientific clairvoyance, led him to develop a method of thinking which would restore the subjective and spiritual to empirical science. For Steiner, philosophy, science and the arts all follow ideally — and necessarily, if we would achieve a truth which is at once personal and universal — from the one capacity of imaginative or intuitive thinking. Ultimately, if one were to follow Steiner's indications for a new method of imaginal thinking, it would lead to a trans-personal mode of perception, of supersensible perception (55). Philosophy would be transformed into conscious, wilful clairvoyance because the philosopher would be thinking by a newly developed capacity reminiscent both of the great philosophers such as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, but equally of the initiates and sages, alchemists and mystics. Because he is a philosopher-initiate of our own century, however, we can evaluate the fruits of his spiritual scientific work and, if so inclined, test the method by which he claims to have produced these achievements. A thorough empiricist in his philosophy and spiritual-scientific research, Steiner insisted that his readers should believe nothing that he said (in his three hundred and fifty volumes of disclosures), but rather conduct their own research. In this regard, Steiner extends the contributions of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle (and the 'footnotes' appended to them), exemplifies the post-religious ideal of scientific objectivity, and would seem to represent perhaps the fullest contemporary reconciliation of philosophy, science and art as a three-fold expression of spiritual discipline.

NOTES

(The second date in parentheses refers to the date of original publication.)


The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully extracted from his writings, I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered through them. His personal ends, his wide opportunities for ex-

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