Curing Philosophy; Philosophy as Cure

Triumph of the Scientific Paradigm

In the preface to his classic work, *Science and the Modern World*, Alfred North Whitehead indicates that philosophy has enjoyed periods of remarkable creativity during which it has established, or at least helped to establish, the dominant paradigm of an age. The paradigm of the present age, however, stems from ideas and methods of thought which are more scientific than philosophical. It is from the dazzling success of scientific assumptions and methodologies that the present age has formed its defining worldview, including the assumptions and criteria for philosophy. Whitehead writes:

Each age has its dominant preoccupation; and during the three centuries in question [seventeenth to the twentieth centuries in the West], the cosmology derived from science has been asserting itself at the expense of older points of view with their origins elsewhere.¹

The Platonic paradigm, coupled with the Judaic–Christian religious experience, established for the Christian centuries the paradigmatic conception of knowledge, human nature, and the world.² Descartes established the split between the mental and physical which has influenced all subsequent thinking in the West, including the unguarded prerreflective thinking of vehement anti-Cartesians.³ Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” established the separation between the noumenal realm—the realm of God, freedom, and immortality—and the phenomenal realm—the realm of sense impressions and nature.⁴ It remains true that we can philosophize against Kant but not without him: Kant’s divided line has proven as influential as the divided line and allegory of the cave of Plato’s Republic.

With respect to the topic of science and spirituality, Kant decisively placed the realm of the religious—in this context, ‘religious’ is interchangeable with the ‘divine’ and the ‘spiritual’—out of the reach of theoretical knowledge. During the two hundred years since Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), philosophers, theologians, and religious thinkers have sought to test Kant’s contention that attempts to prove the reality of God, freedom and immortality crash against the limitations of theoretical reason.
A new paradigm has been forming throughout the twentieth century as a result primarily of physicists and mathematicians—particularly Einstein, Planck, and Heisenberg. This radically altered understanding of the cosmos has been given philosophical expression by a few twentieth-century philosophers, but with the possible exception of Whitehead, this century’s innovations in the sciences, social sciences, and arts still await a philosophical assembler, the vast philosophical reordering of all knowledge such as was last accomplished by Hegel at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Curiously, in his discussion of philosophical assemblers—those who have “made important contributions to philosophic system”—Whitehead names only Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, and James. While Plato, Aristotle, and Leibniz would surely be on any list of philosophical assemblers, James seems an odd selection, and stranger still when placed ahead of paradigmatically systematic thinkers such as Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, and obviously, Hegel.

As James’ pluralism and radical empiricism is essentially anti-systemic in temper, it ill serves the task of philosophical assembling. Royce and Dewey are better examples of philosophic assembling, but Whitehead himself is the most effective assembler of the present century, as is evident when compared with the other two dominant twentieth-century philosophers, Wittgenstein and Heidegger. Wittgenstein may prove to be the most influential philosopher of the present century, but his philosophy, so far from assembling, is best characterized by what Albert William Levi refers to as “the lure of the part.”

In that it is an attempt to formulate a metaphysics of being and human existence, and is deep and innovative on important contemporary themes such as de-personalization, language, and time, Heidegger’s philosophy may be regarded as more comprehensive, or at least as offering a more speculative and systematic metaphysics, than Wittgenstein, but it largely ignores, and in any case does not provide a way of transforming, science. Dewey falls between Wittgenstein and Heidegger in that, with Wittgenstein his thought is radically contextual and with Heidegger he offers a metaphysics of human experience (despite his protestations against metaphysics). In contrast to Wittgenstein, his primary concern is the reconstruction of human communities by the method of democratic intelligence, and in contrast to Heidegger he is enthusiastic concerning the method and contributions of science.

Although it was fashioned more than a half century ago, Whitehead’s metaphysics offers perhaps the best philosophical assembly by which to reconcile the competing sensibilities referred to by the terms science and spirituality. After Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind, Whitehead’s Process and Reality appears to be the text which comes closest to offering sufficient philosophic scope, depth and daring by which to reconcile and advance matter and spirit, the sciences and the arts. Retrospect, of course, may prove otherwise. It remains to be seen whether
J. N. Findlay’s Neoplatonic idealist metaphysics or Milton K. Munitz’ studies in ontology and cosmology might ultimately serve as a solution for characteristically contemporary metaphysical problems.\textsuperscript{11,12}

Overall, however, it seems safe to say that there is presently no English-language philosopher who provides a sufficiently large or detailed body of work to supersede the thought of the classic early twentieth-century philosophers, Royce, James, and Peirce, and their immediate successors, Dewey and Whitehead. Rather, philosophy since mid-century has been split into several traditions, in addition to the dominant analytic paradigm—Marxist, Existentialist, phenomenologist, and pragmatist—none of which appears adequate to the needs of the total person or the total human community. To serve as a cure for contemporary society, contemporary philosophy itself is in need of a cure.\textsuperscript{13}

It seems safe to speculate that the reason for the failure of philosophy is that it has abandoned its primary task and the criteria for knowledge and truth which had accompanied that task: whereas philosophy prior to the triumph of the scientific paradigm—i.e., the triumph of the positivist mentality in the nineteenth century—was concerned with being or existence in general, with knowledge of God, man and nature, and with values such as truth, goodness, and beauty, but by the beginning of the twentieth century, it had abandoned this difficult but essential enterprise in favor of a scientific method and criterion of truth.

This transformation was so forceful that it appeared to most of the intellectual world as obvious and all but irresistible. In his \textit{Pragmatism}, in 1907, James summarized this unhappy situation:

\begin{quote}
For a hundred and fifty years past the progress of science has seemed to mean the enlargement of the material universe and the diminution of man’s importance. The result is what one may call the growth of naturalistic or positivistic feeling. Man is no lawgiver to nature, he is an absorber. She it is who stands firm; he it is who must accommodate himself. Let him record truth, inhuman though it be, and submit to it! The romantic spontaneity and courage are gone, the vision is materialistic and depressing. Ideals appear as inert by-products of physiology; what is higher is explained by what is lower and treated forever as a case of “nothing but”—nothing but something else of a quite inferior sort. You get, in short, a materialistic universe, in which only the tough-minded find themselves congenially at home.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

As he so often does, James here gives us phrases by which to fix the essential problem: the illness of contemporary thought can be understood as the habit of reducing complex, multilayered ideas and realities to a string of ‘nothing buts’—nothing but stimulus response, nothing but particles, nothing but libido and wish-fulfillment, nothing but a series of unguided evolutionary experiments, nothing but
signs or names built up by the utilitarian needs of communities. Over against all of these ‘nothing but’ reductions, James worked for the larger vision, multi-hued realities, the widest variety of samples which just might include the paradigm-bursting ‘white crow.’

James’ other phrase, ‘tough-minded,’ is equally revealing and useful in that it points up the pugilistic style of the philosophic profession, and, since philosophy is well taken as symptomatic of the intellectual temper of our time, of the combative quality of contemporary thinking. The language has shifted only slightly since James’ Pragmatism: for ‘tough,’ we tend to say ‘hard,’ as in ‘hard sciences,’ in contrast to the humanities and other nonscientific disciplines regarded as ‘soft.’

Willfully working in the philosophical framework set forth in the previous generation by William James, Whitehead asks more of philosophy than the extension of a science-based, secondhand paradigm. He sees philosophy as requiring imagination and speculation as well as fact and analysis. Rather than merely implementing the scientific paradigm, philosophy ought to take the lead in fashioning the ideas and ideals which influence all other intellectual and cultural efforts. He writes:

> Philosophy, in one of its functions, is the critic of cosmologies. It is its function to harmonize, refashion and justify divergent intuitions as to the nature of things. It has to insist on the scrutiny of the ultimate ideas, on the retention of the whole of the evidence in shaping our cosmological scheme. Its business is to render explicit and—so far as may be—efficient, a process which otherwise is unconsciously performed without rational tests.

> If my view of philosophy is correct, it is the most effective of all intellectual pursuits. It builds cathedrals before the workmen have moved a stone, and it destroys them before the elements have worn down their arches. It is the architect of the buildings of the spirit, and it is also their solvent:—and the spiritual precedes the material.

Such is the ideal of philosophy which Whitehead proposes in his masterful interpretation of the role of sciences in modern western thought: philosophy ought to be there first, ought to serve as architect and as the catalyst of paradigm revision.

To a greater degree than James or Whitehead realized, however, philosophizing out of, or in concert with, spirit, requires a new—and in some respects, an old—philosophical method. Philosophizing out of, and on behalf of, spirit is possible only by a mode of cognition which avoids the materialistic presuppositions and limitations of the modern western paradigm. It requires spiritually-based thinking such as was practiced by Plato and by medieval Christian philosophical theologians, by most practitioners of Hindu and Buddhist philosophy, as well as
by some western thinkers such as Swedenborg and Steiner, and to a lesser extent, Goethe and Emerson, who are apparently in touch with spiritual reality.

Unfortunately, contemporary philosophy, both in theory and practice, emphatically excludes any possible contribution which might issue from a meditative or contemplation effort. As it prefers analysis to speculation, and argument to assent, it also prefers combat to contemplation. But it is by contemplation that the impersonal and universal can triumph over the subjective, the self-interested and the self-indulgent. Since the Buddhist path, based on the Buddha’s first sermon, “The Four Noble Truths,” offers a carefully articulated, historically honored and extensively implemented effort to replace the self-interested by the impersonal and universal, it might be revealing to apply the “Four Noble Truths” to the task of philosophizing as a spiritual discipline.

Four Noble Truths and the Cure of Philosophy

Along with the aphoristic “Know Thyself” of the Delphic Oracle and Jesus’ “Sermon on the Mount,” the “Four Noble Truths” of Gotama the Buddha must rank as one of the most inspired and influential of all sage prescriptions. And, like the words of Jesus, the words of Buddha possess a universal validity capable of multiple applications. Even the thoroughly secular and profane discipline of philosophy can be illumined by the sage fourfold insight which the Buddha revealed in his first sermon after his enlightenment experience.17

I. All existence is dukkha, suffering;
II. Dukkha arises in (is caused by) desire;
III. Dukkha due to craving is curable;
IV. The cure is the eightfold path:
   1. Right understanding
   2. Right purpose
   3. Right speech
   4. Right conduct
   5. Right vocation
   6. Right effort
   7. Right alertness
   8. Right concentration

The following attempt to use the Four Noble Truths as a criterion for philosophizing is written by a student (and professor) of philosophy and of Buddhism, but, as should be evident, one who is neither enlightened nor a Buddhist. With respect to the four noble truths, in reverse order, (4) the present author has not trod the eightfold path, (3) has not effectively realized that craving is curable, nor
(2) that suffering arises in desire, nor (1), most damagingly, has he realized with sufficient clarity or resolve that existence is dukkha. With the bulk of humanity, he clings to himself, to his family and friends, possessions and privileges, and, of particular relevance for the present topic, to his ideas.

On the positive side, he does at least recognize, if only intellectually, that the Buddha attained a profound and universal spiritual insight, and that it is applicable to all significant human efforts, including the ordinarily cold, intellectual task of philosophy. At a minimum, the joining of the Four Noble Truths to contemporary philosophizing ought to tell us something about each of these important topics, and, more optimistically, it might tell us something about the latent spiritual, and therefore transforming and liberating, powers of philosophy.

I. Philosophy as Dukkha

Depending on the method or attitude in question, philosophy could be a path of either liberation or further suffering. In Buddhist terms, it could be an exercise in letting go, or of craving. We give our own meaning to the Johannine phrase, "the truth shall set you free." Knowledge as power can be used to influence human events or to extricate oneself from the bondage of ignorance and body. Socrates regarded philosophy as a kind of dying because it is the deliberate overcoming of the enslavement by the body. This conception of philosophy is not currently in fashion.

Contemporary philosophy, then, in direct opposition to the Socratic tradition, is dukkha because it leads to more desire—ever more unsatisfying and insatiable desire. Socrates was satisfied by philosophy because he used questioning, truth-seeking, as a way of overcoming his ordinary consciousness, his unenlightenment. He did not have an experience such as Gotama's, an experience whereby all was changed, changed utterly. But he did end his life with the conviction that he had been heading toward the happiness which surpasses incarnated understanding. This conception of philosophy is not in fashion because we are convinced—as were most of Socrates' contemporaries, the Sophists, whom we resemble while pretending that we are Socratic—that existence, including the material world, and particularly the human body, is a work of art to be prized above all else.

We can imagine that the Buddha would explain to contemporary western thinkers that the existence to which they are attached—and to which Buddha, Socrates, and Jesus were unattached—needs not to be affirmed, but overcome. In this way the Buddha's insight is extended so as to render philosophizing an edifying activity. Philosophy too can be a way of overcoming attachment, and in the process a way of attaining wisdom. Along with all other attachments, philosophy is itself a cause of suffering—it is unenlightened and, in its contemporary western methods, it is unenlightening and therefore unliberating.
II. Philosophy as Dukkha which Arises in Desire

Socrates recognized that the unphilosophical mind, as well as the body, is a desirer which works counter to wisdom and immortality. Socrates and Buddha agree that the unenlightened mind craves its own truths, its own meanings. The Sophists opposed Socrates by their maxim, “man is the measure.” “It’s true if it’s true for you,” the students say. Socrates sought the truth that was free of the craving of the body and of the ordinary mind. In this sense, modern western philosophy is not only post-Socratic but non- or anti-Socratic: rather than loving wisdom, we seek the limited truth which affirms mind and body, particularly my mind, my body.

Buddha would no doubt observe that contemporary philosophizing “tends not to edification.” Socrates would regret the success of his opponents, the Sophists, in contemporary philosophical method and result. As the Sophist sought the answer which yielded power, contemporary philosophy aims not for transformation but clarification, not for enlightenment but empowerment. Because philosophy seeks clarity and control, both of which are forms of craving, it is in our time a source and symptom of our entrapment by dukkha.

III. Philosophy as Dukkha is Curable

Philosophy can be a form of release from the bondage of self-ignorance and insatiable craving. Socrates is not the only such example: a fuller—though by no means full—list of thinkers who seem to have practiced philosophy as a spiritual discipline would include: Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus among the Greeks, as well as Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, both Roman stoics; many philosopher-theologians in the Christian Middle Ages, including Augustine, Scotus Erigena, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, Nicholas of Cusa; and among the moderns, Swedenborg, Spinoza, Goethe, Coleridge, Emerson, Rudolf Steiner, and perhaps Josiah Royce, Martin Buber, and J. N. Findlay; the list of Indian philosophers, or jnana-yogis, is endless, and would include among the most prominent, Sankara, Ramanuja, Ramana Maharshi, Sri Aurobindo, and J. Krishnamurti; in the Buddhist tradition, we would mention, beginning with the Buddha, Ashvagosha, Nagarjuna, Bodhicakarana, Dogen, D. T. Suzuki, Nishida, Nishitani, and His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama.

It might also be that in the present century, the great jnana-yogis, practitioners of thinking as a spiritual discipline, are scientists such as Einstein and David Bohm and writers such as Yeats and Joyce.

All of these great figures evidence the fact that dukkha is curable. Although we study these figures, we do not believe that they overcame the craving of which philosophy, for us, is an expression. Perhaps we do not believe that the ordinary
condition is dukkha, nor, perhaps, that dukkha arises in our desiring. Whether we fail at the first or second noble truth, or more likely, at both, we reduce these figures to the intellectual level. By minimizing the reality dukkha due to craving, we limit the spiritual significance of their achievement.

By minimizing the effect of craving, we “free” ourselves from having to admit the extent to which the solutions of these great figures can and should affect our own thinking. Their existentially exacting lifework confirm that truth is of the spirit, never merely of the physical; of the universal, never merely of the individual. With such bad news threatening our worldview, we manage to read these figures in terms of metaphors and paradigms rather than as autobiographical accounts of the spiritual manifest through their patient, selfless, mind- and body-transforming discipline.

IV. The Eightfold Path: Curing Oneself by Curing Philosophy

1. Right Understanding

The first step on the path of curing oneself by curing philosophy is to understand the extent to which all of us—including vehement anti-positivists, and pro-spiritualists—are limited in our thinking by what Owen Barfield calls the Residue of Unresolved Positivism. We do not rightly understand our own thinking; we separate subject from object, self from world, inner from outer, and then assume that we can rejoin these by unconscious, unwillful activities. No such rejoicing is possible without disciplined effort. Yet such discipline is not taught in philosophy courses, and is generally thought to be irrelevant to philosophic pursuit, whether as practiced by professionals or amateurs.

2. Right Aspiration

Contrary to the assumption guiding most philosophic activity that philosophy consists in discrete ideas and self-standing analyses, right philosophic aspiration would include the goal of personal transformation. We need not agree with Socrates that philosophy is a kind of dying, but Right Aspiration should include the realization that progress toward truth concerning human nature, the physical and spiritual, love, truth, beauty and justice, certainly is not possible without a dying to self-interested modes of thinking. The extent of our self-interested approach and use of knowledge is evident not only in society in general, but most obviously in academic philosophy.
3. Right Speech

Two thousand years before George Orwell’s creation and critique of newspeak, the Confucian tradition countered the disastrous effects of the false use of language by its concept of the rectification of names. In his essay Nature, Emerson disclosed the ways in which words are signs of natural fact, and natural facts are manifestations of spirit. In the modern West, all such links between language and its roots in the spiritual world have been lost—along with the spiritual root of all sound and communication, whether music, poetry, or mantras. Advertising knows only superlatives and politicians divide supporters and resisters into ‘freedom fighters’ and ‘guerrillas.’

Right speech requires an overcoming of all forms of nominalism—the view that names are ‘nothing but’ social conventions. Philosophers have signed on with the social scientific—primarily anthropological and comparative linguistic—assumption that language is nothing but community forms. The social scientific, nominalistic, understanding of language and speech is not wrong in what it affirms—language is partly built up out of social forms—but it is not nothing but social forms. Language is rooted in spiritual and psychic realities long since denied by, and therefore unrevealing to, contemporary thought.

The surest sign of the triumph of nominalism is the misuse of imaginative language. In contrast to contemporary aesthetics, by which art is independent of epistemology and ontology, or truth and being, the Buddhist path of Right Speech requires an aesthetics and a psychology which recognizes that images are realities, and are continuous with spiritual and psychic structures and dynamic processes. Jung understood this well as do most transpersonal psychologies. In philosophy, Ernst Cassirer and Susanne Langer are among the very few to understand that homo symbolicum requires a fidelity to the authentic depth and healing power of right language.

4. Right Conduct

Philosophy influences and issues from human action. Dewey understood that all experience is pedagogical. The quality of our behavior directly determines the nature and extent of our knowing. In the Hindu yoga teachings, jnana—yoga (knowledge as spiritual discipline) can not advance without karma—yoga (action as spiritual discipline). Most spiritual and esoteric teachers insist that advancement in esoteric knowledge presupposes moral action. In his Knowledge of the Higher Worlds and Its Attainment, Rudolf Steiner warns the novice in esoteric training that for every step one takes in pursuit of higher knowledge, it is necessary to take three steps toward the perfection of one’s own character.
5. Right Vocation

Philosophy as an academic career, as distinct from a profession or vocation, is relatively recent, dating to the separation of knowledge and values which accompanied the steady growth of academic specialization since the mid-nineteenth Century. The loss of lifelong training by an acknowledged master has been accompanied by the loss of the ideal of philosophy as a life mission. The etymology of philosophy, 'love of wisdom,' is mocked by virtually all of the conceptions, methods and results of contemporary academic philosophy. Philosophy as Right Vocation, as service to wisdom, would require a willful service to ideals which would lead to both attainment of wisdom and transformation of the philosopher. Such service is still in evidence in our time, but generally not among academically prestigious professionals.

6. Right Effort

For philosophy to be cured, and to serve as an instrument for the cure of individual and community ills, nothing short of total, disciplined effort is required. Not only our knowledge, but our thinking—the mode, capacity, purity of our thinking—needs to be observed, disciplined and transformed. We will need models, guides, and rules if we are to avoid both arrogant independence and disciplic dependence. With the example and precept of Emerson, the path of Right Action will lead each person to develop into an original philosopher in need of, and capable of, realizing "an original relation to the universe."²⁸

7. Right Alertness

Emerson, the philosopher—sage of alertness, writes:

A man should learn to detect and watch that gleam of light which flashes across his mind from within, more than the lustre of the firmament of bards and sages. Yet he dismisses without notice his thought, because it is his.²⁹

Because of his contemporary philosophic preference for analysis and argumentation, such attention to one's own alertness, to the process and means of improving one's thinking, or, rather, oneself as a thinker, has become foreign to philosophizing. At a time in our cultural life when 'inner' attention has become an important aid to numerous activities and disciplines, including golf and sex, it remains dissociated from the 'love of wisdom.'
8. Right Concentration

In our present situation, philosophy has so sided with natural and social sciences that it disdains imagination and meditation. For philosophy to be cured, and to serve as cure, we need to reintegrate meditative disciplines and philosophy, not merely as a complement or polarity. The essential need is to cultivate both meditative philosophizing and conscious willful meditation. ‘Cured,’ ‘enlightened’ philosophizing requires not only dreams and myths, but strenuous effort at reaching those thoughts and ideas which are at once universal and personal.

Owen Barfield, presently in his ninetieth sage year, offers a passage quoted at length below, which presents the possibility of realizing the ideal of the eighth path—Right Alertness—as well as describing a new kind of philosophizing, one that is both spiritual and wide awake. In this passage, the truth-seeker receives a revelation of which he is at one and the same time the recipient and source. The truth-seekers would gain access to true thoughts which are one’s own, but because this thinker generates them at the level of intuitive-spiritual thinking, such thoughts are also spiritual and universal, and are experienced as though from a source other than oneself.

The spiritual thinker discovers these ideas which live in his or her own spiritual reality, in one’s spiritual self. The capacity for thinking spiritually is terribly difficult to attain because it requires the transformation not only of the mind—difficult as this is—but also of the heart and will. Such a thinker who attains access to his or her spiritual thinking self, however, has access to ideas which are intuited in, of, by, through the spiritual world of which the spiritual thinker (in concert with one’s spiritual affect and volition) is consciously a member. Philosophy and spirituality, clear deliberate thinking and spiritual revelation, are thereby joined.

In this passage, a spiritual guide, for whom Barfield uses the term magus, is explaining that in addition to one’s ordinary thoughts, which are like a mirror, there are also thoughts behind the mirror which are free, spiritual and generative. This image begs comparison with Plato’s allegory of the cave except that Barfield is at pains to show the close relationship between the two kinds of thinking, and to show that everyone is invited to break out of ordinary thinking.

You are one of those who have at least peeped behind the mirror. And what you have found there so far is thought. But these thoughts are other than your memory-thoughts, of which they are none the less the source and origin. For these are the creative thoughts themselves. They are the substance, not only of the world which brain and sense reflect, but also of brain and sense themselves; they are nothing remembered, because they are one with the life itself that supports and enables the act
of memory. Therefore it is that, when you experience them—as you do
the memory thoughts—as being 'your own' because spun from your
brain. They own an objectivity which in terms of everyday life you can
better compare with perceiving than with thinking. And yet they are in-
deed your own in the deepest sense of all, because, unlike the memory
thoughts, they are also your substance and your life; so that to perceive
them is verily to perceive the spirit within you in the act of creating.30

Such free thinking is not unlike the achievement of the Buddha: to be free is
to live in the world fully aware that the sense world (to which we were attached
prior to enlightenment) is the occasion for our seeing-thinking spirit. The differ-
ence between Barfield's view and the Buddha's can be summarized by the modes
of consciousness accurately labelled 'traditional Indian' and 'modern western.' Be-
hind the sense world Barfield does not see-think Nirvana (or Emptiness, or Bliss,
a no-thingness which is a dynamic peace-bestowing Stillness), but rather the spir-
itual world which is teeming with spiritual being, including true, free ideas which
are the source and substance of true philosophizing as a spiritual activity.31

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and be cured. Audio tapes of Dr. McDermott's presentation and panel discussion are available
from the Foundation.

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